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Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law
Michael J. Zimmer*
This article discusses the decision of the Supreme Court inReeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc.' This case may be an even more important individual
disparate treatment case than the Supreme Court's 1993 decisions in Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins,2 and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.3 After Hicks, Professor
Deborah Malamud analyzed all of the so-called McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green4 line of individual disparate treatment cases and concluded that a
fundamental weakness in that approach was that "the Court's prior disparate
treatment decisions... never succeeded in setting the prima facie case threshold
high enough to permit the proven prima facie case to support a sufficiently strong
inference of discrimination to mandate judgment for the plaintiff when combined
only with disbelief of the employer's stated justification."5 The Court has not yet
resolved that question. The evidence supporting the prima facie case plus evidence
that defendant's reason is false does support a fact finder drawing the inference of
intent to discriminate. Further, in reviewing that evidence plus the other
circumstantial evidence for the purpose of deciding motions for summaryjudgment
and judgment as a matter of law, the Court indicated that every inference must be
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, typically the plaintiff.6 Still, judgment for
plaintiff is not mandated.
Alternatively, Reeves may be important but more limited. In that view, Reeves
overturns the pretext-plus rule that had narrowed the McDonnell Douglas analysis
even further than had Hazen Paper and Hicks, but it otherwise leaves intact the
common practice of courts in slicing and dicing the evidence supporting plaintiff s
case in order to grant motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of
law. The basis for this more limited reading of Reeves is that the Supreme Court
spent much of its opinion applying the rules as to motions for summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law to the facts of this particular case rather than
announcing any new rules about how this should work. Lower courts may feel less
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compelled to follow the example of the Supreme Court than they might otherwise
be if the Court had announced new legal rules.
Only the future will tell which path the lower courts will take the law as a result
of Reeves. It is the goal of this article to develop the expansive path, the path that
will aid immeasurably in implementing our antidiscrimination laws. To
demonstrate that potential path, Section I of this article will set forth the
conventional structure of individual disparate treatment law as contemplated by
Supreme Court precedent. Section II will show, from a global perspective, how the
Fifth Circuit decision in Reeves misused that structure to circumscribe individual
disparate treatment law almost completely. Section III then discusses both the
substantive and the procedural issues decided by the Supreme Court decision in
Reeves. Having looked at the two issues, the section sets forth how the effect of
Reeves is greater than the individual import of the two issues decided; in other
words the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Section IV looks at the early
returns of how the lower courts have applied Reeves, and the final section will look
at why Reeves is yet to be followed.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL STRUCTURE OF INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT
CASES
The analyses of individual disparate treatment cases, at least as viewed from
Supreme Court precedent, is to first decide whether the "direct" evidence approach,
created in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins' (as modified by the Civil Rights Act of
1991 amendments to Title VII) applies.' Absent evidence that is sufficiently
"direct," the "circumstantial"9 evidence approach established in McDonnell
Douglas° is the default method of analysis. That makes the boundary between the
two methods, the presence of"direct" versus "circumstantial" evidence, a boundary
that the Supreme Court has left undefined.
7. 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
8. "Direct' evidence has been defined several different ways. The classic, but now rejected,
definition in the law of evidence is evidence that proves the fact at issue without the need to draw an
inference. For a discussion of this classic test, see Michael J. Zimnmer, The Emerging Uniform
Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation. 30 Ga. L. Rev. 563, 611-16 (1996)
[hereinafter, Zimmer, Uniform Structure]. An example of that may be an admission by the employer
to the employee that, "I am discharging you because you are too old." While the Supreme Court has
not defined what is direct evidence, the lower courts have developed a number of different approaches.
There are other, broader definitions that some courts have come to use in discrimination cases. For a
discussion of these approaches, see Michael J. Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: Individual Disparate
Treatment Discrimination and the ADEA, 51 Mercer L. Rev. 693 (2000) [hereinafter, Zimmer, Chaos
or Coherence].
9. "Circumstantial" evidence is evidence that can be used to support drawing an inference of
the fact at issue. In individual disparate treatment cases, the key fact at issue is the intent of the
employer to discriminate. Where an employee shows that she is within a group protected against
discrimination and that she has been doing a good job but then is fired and replaced by another person
not in her protected group, there is circumstantial evidence to support drawing the inference on the fact
at issue, whether the employer discharged her because of an intent to discriminate.
10. 411 U.S. 792,93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973).
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For a case to go to the fact fmder under Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff must
introduce direct evidence (typically with additional circumstantial evidence)
sufficient under the preponderance of evidence standard to support a reasonable fact
finder concluding that the impermissible characteristic, such as race or gender, was
"a motivating factor" for the employer's decision that plaintiff challenges." "A
motivating factor" is a low threshold of liability since it is met if race or gender is
found to play any role at all in the employer's decision. If the fact finder does find
that the impermissible characteristic was "a motivating factor," that raises the
question whether the employer has introduced evidence sufficient to support the fact
finder drawing an inference that it nevertheless "would have taken the same action
in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.' 2 If the fact finder finds that
the employer has carried its burden of persuasion on this so-called "same decision"
defense, then the defendant is still held liable for having discriminated but plaintiff
is entitled only to limited remedies. 3
If the court finds that the threshold for applying Price Waterhouse is not met
because plaintiffhas not introduced evidence that the court is willing to characterize
as sufficiently "direct," then McDonnell Douglas applies. To go to the fact finder
under McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff must introduce evidence sufficient under the
preponderance of evidence test to support an inference that the plaintiff's treatment
by the employer was not the result of the most common reasons that would explain
the employer's decision as nondiscriminatory. 4 That inference creates in favor of
the plaintiff a presumption that the reason for the employer's action was
discriminatory." That presumption puts the burden on the defendant to produce
evidence that it acted for a nondiscriminatory reason.'6 Ultimately, if a material
11. Section 703(m), added to Title VII in the 1991 amendments, sets the "motivating factor"level
of showing necessary to establish liability. Since the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII but
not the ADEA in setting the "motivating factor" threshold, it is not clear that this threshold applies in
age discrimination cases. While the ADEA was not amended in this provision, the 1991 Act does
nothing to foreclose courts from looking to Title VII in establishing the federal common law definition
of "discrimination" for age discrimination cases brought under the ADEA.
12. Section 706(g)(2)(B) (2000).
13. If the provisions of the 1991 Act are not used by analogy in ADEA actions to establish the
federal common law meaning of the term "discrimination," then presumably the original holding of
Price Waterhouse applies in age discrimination cases, so the proof of the same decision defense is a
complete bar to defendant's liability.
14. In McDonnell Douglas, a hiring case, plaintiff established aprima facie case by showing (i)
that he belonged to a racial minority group; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants. By
showing this, plaintiff eliminated two nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring him--that he wasn't
qualified and that no job was open. 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1826 (1973).
15. The presumption means defendant loses if it does nothing. What is problematic here can be
most easily understood in the context of "reverse" discrimination cases. Does a showing by a white
male that he was not hired despite being qualified for a job that was open, the facts of McDonnell,
support an inference that he was discriminated against because of his race? By itself, the answer is no.
16. The burden on the defendant is a burden of production only. The employer need not carry the
burden of persuasion that the nondiscriminatory reason it asserts actually was the basis of the action,
2001)
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issue of fact still exists, then the case goes to the fact finder, with the plaintiff
carrying the burden of proving the ultimate question of whether the defendant
acted with an intent to discriminate. This third step of analysis is sometimes
called the "pretext" step because the issue is typically framed as a question of
whether defendant's asserted reason for its action was not actually the reason
for its action but instead was a pretext, a cover, to hide discrimination. Hicks
made clear that plaintiff's proof of her prima facie case and proof that the
defendant's reason was false did not justify summary judgment for plaintiff
because the fact finder had to find the ultimate fact, that is, that defendant acted
with an intent to discriminate. To do that, plaintiff must convince the fact
finder that the preponderance of evidence supports an inference that the
impermissible characteristic, such as race, sex or age, was the determinative
influence in the employer's decision. To put that another way, but for
discrimination, the employer would not have taken the challenged action
against plaintiff. If the jury finds the employer acted with the intent to
discriminate, plaintiff wins and is entitled to full remedies.
The same decision defense that is available in Price Waterhouse cases is
not applicable in McDonnell Douglas cases because a finding that the
determinative influence in the decision was an impermissible characteristic
forecloses the possibility that the employer could have made the same decision
if it had not considered plaintiff's race, gender or age. Stated differently, if the
plaintiff has proved the employer would not have taken the action but for
plaintiff's race, gender or age, that necessarily means that the employer would
not have taken the action in the absence of that impermissible factor.
Ir brief comparison of the two methods of analyzing individual disparate
treatment cases, the Price Waterhouse approach has the lower threshold
showing-that the impermissible characteristic was "a motivating factor," but
the defendant has a chance to limit plaintiff's full remedies by proving,
nevertheless, that it would have made the same decision even "in the absence
of the impermissible motivating factor." In contrast, McDonnell Douglas
presents a higher threshold to plaintiff, the determinative factor test, but such
a showing precludes defendant's use of the affirmative, same decision
defense. 7
plaintiff challenges. According to United States District Judge Denny Chin, no defendant in any
reported case has failed to comec forward with evidence that it acted from a nondiscriminatory reason.
See Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplfied Method for
Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 659 (1998) [hereinafter, Chin, Moving
Beyond McDonnell Douglas].
17. Since the Supreme Court has not defined what "direct" evidence is, the lower courts, in
patrolling the boundary between the Price Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas methods of analyzing
individual disparate treatment cases, have adopted a variety of approaches as to what constitutes
"direct" evidence sufficient to trigger the Price Waterhouse approach. The interaction between and
within these competing analyses give the courts enormous discretion in their treatment of cases. There
is little uniformity among the circuit courts of appeal. See Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence, supra note
8, at 3.
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II. THE FiFT CIRcurr DECISION IN REEVES
The Fifth Circuit manipulated the conventional structure of individual disparate
treatment law to limit very stringently the scope of the law against discrimination.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,"8 an age discrimination case, is a
good example of how that court applied individual disparate treatment law to
virtually foreclose a successful individual disparate treatment case. Plaintiff, age
fifty-seven when he was discharged, had worked for the company for forty years
and had been the supervisor for many years of the regular production line in the
department that made hinges for toilet seats. By the time of trial, the employer had
successively employed three different replacements for the plaintiff. All were in
their thirties; apparently none had worked out. Plaintiff also introduced evidence
that one of the three decisionmakers in plaintiff's termination, the person with the
real power in the plant because of.his marriage to the company president, had
several months prior described plaintiff as so old that he "must have come over on
the Mayflower," and that he was "too damn old to do the job."
Looking at the evidence first as a Price Waterhouse case, these age-related
comments did not satisfy the Fifth Circuit's strict view of what constitutes "direct"
evidence for the purpose of applying Price Waterhouse. In Brown v. East
Mississippi Electric Power Ass 'n, 9 the court defined "direct" evidence according
to the classic evidence notion of, "evidence which, if believed, proves the fact
without inference or presumption." Under such a narrow definition, only something
like an admission by a decisionmaker that "Reeves, you are fired because you are
too old" would be "direct" enough to trigger the application of the Price
Waterhouse approach.2°
Since the age-related statements were not connected immediately to Reeves'
discharge and, therefore, did not prove the employer's intent to discriminate without
need to draw an inference, the default rules for McDonnell Douglas applied. The
employer did not contest that plaintiff had established a prima facie case under the
modified McDonnell Douglas approach that the Fifth Circuit takes to age
discrimination discharge cases.2' In rebuttal to plaintiff's prima facie case, the
18. 197 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 133,120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000). The decision was
originally issued without published opinion, 180 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1999), but it was published and
therefore became precedent once the Supreme Court decided to hear the case. Unpublished decisions,
pursuant to the rules of the Fifth Circuit, are not precedent, see U.S.C.S. Ct. App. 5th Cir. § 47.5.4
(2000). The Eighth Circuit recently decided that its rule denying precedent status to unpublished
opinions is unconstitutional, though that decision was vacated as moot. Anastasoffv. United States,
223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, No. 99-3917EM, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 32055 (8th Cir.
Dec. 18,2000).
19. 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993).
20. This classic definition of "direct" evidence lives on in individual disparate treatment law,
having long since been rejected by the law of evidence. See Zimmer, Uniform Structure, supra note 8,
at3.
21. The McDonnell Douglas test that has been modified for age discrimination discharge cases
in the Fifth Circuit comes from Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993):
20011
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employer introduced evidence that its nondiscriminatory reason for firing plaintiff
was his shoddy maintenance of the time cards of the employees under his
supervision. In his case-in-chief, plaintiff introduced evidence that, between the
time he was fired and the trial, the employer had changed its reason for discharging
him and that, in any event, his record keeping was not shoddy. That meant the case,
like all McDonnell Douglas cases, turned on plaintiff carrying his ultimate burden
of proving intentional discrimination at the third stage-pretext stage. At this final
stage of analysis, the fact finder must decide whether defendant acted with an intent
to discriminate and that this intent was of determinative influence in the employer's
decision.2'
The trial court sent the case to the jury relying on McDonnell Douglas, and the
jury found for plaintiff. On defendant's appeal of the jury verdict and of the trial
court's denial of a judgment as a matter of law, the Fifth Circuit reversed:
"Considering all the evidence in a light most favorable to Reeves, we nevertheless
conclude that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that Sanderson
discharged Reeves because of his age."23 In support of that conclusion, the court
said that "Reeves failed to offer evidence sufficient to prove both that [the shoddy
record keeping] reason is untrue and that age is what really triggered Reeve's
discharge."24 But then the court said that "Reeves very well may be correct" and
that a "reasonable jury could have found that Sanderson's explanation for its
employment decision was pretextual."2 So what the court was saying finally is that
the plaintiff introduced enough evidence to support drawing the inference that the
defendant's reason was not the true reason for the defendant's action but had failed
In age discrimination cases, the plaintiff is required to make a prima facie case, wherein he
must demonstrate that: (1) he was discharged; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he
was within the protected class at the time of discharge; and (4) he was either (i) replaced by
someone outside the protected class, (ii) replaced by someone younger, or (iii) otherwise
discharged because of his age.
Defendant did not challenge that plaintiff was in fact (i) discharged, (2) was qualified, (3) was over age
40, and (4)(i) had been replaced by someone outside the protected class.
22. Given the determinative influence standard of proof, the fact finder can find that the
defendant's reason, or some other reason, did play some role in its decision and can still find for
plaintiff as long as it finds that the impermissible characteristic was the determinative or "but for"
reason for the defendant's action. See Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(rejects rule that plaintiff must prove that discrimination was the sole cause of the defendant's action).
23. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1999). The court
further explicated its standard of review on appeal:
A motion for judgment as a matter of law.. .in an action tried by jury is a challenge to the
legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. We review the denial of such
motions de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. A JML is appropriate if
the "facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that a
reasonable jury could not have concluded" as the jury did. Applying this standard to the
instant case, the district court's judgment should be reversed only if "there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find" that Sanderson discharged Reeves
because of his age.
Id.
24. Id. at 692.
25. Id. at 693.
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to prove the second part, that this false reason was used as a cover to hide its
discrimination. Under the pretext-plus rule, more evidence was necessary before
the jury could, upon sufficient evidence, draw the inference that defendant acted
with an intent to discriminate.
Assuming that the jury did fird that the defendant's asserted reason for the
discharge was not true, what other evidence was there "that age is what really
triggered Reeve's discharge?" One kind of evidence in the record is the evidence
that made up the prima facie case in the first instance. But a premise for the Fifth
Circuit's finding that "Reeves failed to offer evidence sufficient to prove.., that
age is what really triggered Reeve's discharge " ' was the conclusion that the
evidence that established plaintiffs prima facie case lost its probative force once
the defendant introduced its rebuttal evidence. Thus, the court required additional
evidence, over and above the evidence that made out the prima facie case, to satisfy
its "pretext-plus" rule."'
A second type of evidence is the age-related comments of one of the
decisionmakers. The court characterized that evidence as "stray remarks,"
insufficient even as circumstantial evidence to support the jury in drawing the
inference of intent to discriminate. According to the court:
Age-related comments may serve as sufficient evidence of discrimination
if the remarks are (1) proximate in time to the termination; (2) made by an
individual with authority over the challenged employment decision; and
(3) related to that employment decision. Mere "stray remarks"--i.e.,
comments which are "vague and remote in time"--however, are
insufficient to establish discrimination.2"
What is stunning about the Fifth Circuit's use of this test is that it denies this
circumstantial evidence of all its probative value in drawing the inference of intent
to discriminate just because it was not conclusive proof of the defendant's state of
mind. Evidence that, if believed, shows that the age of a worker was on the mind
of a decisionmaker does not require a fact finder to draw the inference that that
worker's discharge was because of his age, but it surely supports a fact finder
drawing that inference. This is especially true when the plaintiff has produced
evidence that the supposed nondiscriminatory reason was not true.
26. Id. at 692.
27. In Kline v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 128 F.3d 337, 343 (6th Cir. 1997), the court
described the "pretext-plus" rule this way: "The plaintiff must not only demonstrate that the employer's
asserted reasons were pretextual, but the plaintiff also must introduce additional evidence of
discrimination."
28. Reeves, 197 F.3d at 692 (quoting Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 654 (5th Cir.
1996)). While somewhat broader than the classic definition of "direct" evidence that the Fifth Circuit
uses as the threshold to the application of Price Waterhouse, this definition of when evidence of age-
related comments is circumstantial evidence supporting a finding of intent to discriminate is the
definition several other circuits use to describe evidence that is sufficiently "direct" to trigger the
application of Price Waterhouse. See Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171 (2d Cir.
1992); Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3d Cir. 1993) (following Ostrowski), overruled
on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (1995) (en banc).
2001]
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If all circumstantial evidence were reviewed for its relevance using the standard
that the Fifth Circuit uses for these age-related statements, very little circumstantial
evidence would ever be considered probative,29 and summaryjudgment or judgment
as a matter of law would be dictated in almost all McDonnell Douglas cases.
Slicing and dicing from the record the evidence of a prima facie case as well
as the evidence of age-related statements made by a decisionmaker about the
plaintiff because neither is by itself conclusive undermines the possibility that any
circumstantial evidence can ever be the basis for a fact finder to conclude that the
employer's act was motivated by an intent to discriminate. Such an approach
ultimately denies that circumstantial evidence can be used to prove intent to
discriminate and suggests that McDonnell Douglas is no longer a viable method of
analyzing individual disparate treatment discrimination cases.
That conclusion is supported by looking at the circumstantial evidence present
in the case but which nevertheless the court said could not support drawing the
inference of intent to discriminate. First, the proof of plaintiff's prima facie case
was conceded so that the jury should have been directed to find that the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for discharge-that plaintiff lacked the
qualifications to do the job or the job had ceased to exist--did not apply and so
these reasons, the most common legitimate reasons for a discharge, could not
explain plaintiff's discharge. Second, there was the evidence introduced by the
employer that plaintiff was discharged for shoddy record keeping which the
reviewing court admitted the jury could have found not to be true. Third, there was
evidence of age related statements that a jury could have believed and that
supported the inference that one of the decisionmakers in plaintiff's discharge not
only had age on his mind but also specifically had age on his mind as a negative
about plaintiff. There was also evidence that this particular manager made the
important decisions in the plant.
It is true that the employer did introduce evidence in addition to its evidence
that Reeves was discharged for shoddy record keeping. Given that the court
rejected the probative value of all the evidence supporting plaintiff's case, the court
had only defendant's evidence to review in deciding to set aside the jury verdict.
According to the court:
Despite the potentially damning nature of Chesnut's age-related
comments, it is clear that these comments were not made in the direct
context of Reeves's termination. In addition, Chesnut was just one of
three individuals who recommended to Ms. Sanderson [the company
president and wife of Chesnut] that Reeves be terminated, and there is no
evidence to suggest that any of the other decisionmakers were motivated
by age. In fact, the record shows that at least two of the decisionmakers
were themselves over the age of 50-Ms. Sanderson at 52, and Jester at
56. Furthermore, the fact remains that, as a result of the 1995
29. The court does not say this but it may be that it thought that the jury should not have found
that these age related statements even occurred. Plaintiff's testimony as to the time, place and
circumstance of these statements by Chesnut were vague and Chesnut denied ever making them.
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investigation, each of the three Hinge Room supervisors was accused of
inaccurate record keeping, including not only Reeves and Caldwell, but 35
year old Oswalt as well. Finally, there is evidence that, at the time Reeves
was dismissed, twenty of the company's management positions were filled
by people over the age of 50, including several employees in their late
60s.
30
Only by slicing and dicing away the probative value of the evidence of the prima
facie case, of the falsity of defendant's explanation and of the age-related
statements, was the Fifth Circuit able to conclude that there was insufficient
evidence to support a jury in drawing the inference that defendant acted with an
intent to discriminate. If used by courts generally, such slicing and dicing of all of
plaintiff's evidence is the death knell for the McDonnell Douglas approach.
To put the Fifth Circuit's approach into the larger context of all of individual
disparate treatment law, the scope of liability is quite narrow. If plaintiff cannot
successfully argue that evidence in the record satisfies the very narrow direct
evidence threshold required by the Fifth Circuit for use of the Price Waterhouse
approach, then plaintiff is also not likely to satisfy the pretext-plus requirement that
the court has imposed on the McDonnell Douglas approach. This is true even
where the plaintiff is successful, as he was in Reeves, in proving his prima facie case
and proving that the employer's reason for its action was false. Evidence of age-
related comments that fail to satisfy the narrow direct evidence test for Price
Waterhouse will only be probative to a finding of intent to discriminate based on
the McDonnell Douglas approach if that evidence satisfies the Fifth Circuit's
slightly broader "circumstantial-plus" definition of direct evidence, i.e., that "the
remarks are (1) proximate in time to the termination; (2) made by an individual with
authority over the challenged employment decision; and (3) related to that
employment decision."'" This is close to saying that plaintiffs can only win an
individual disparate treatment case under either McDonnell Douglas or Price
Waterhouse by satisfying the stringent threshold of either classic "direct" or
"circumstantial-plus" evidence for the use of the Price Waterhouse approach. In
short, the only path to liability is that small subset of all individual disparate
treatment cases where plaintiff has "direct evidence ... which if believed, proves
the fact of intent to discriminate without inference or presumption."3" In sum, the
Fifth Circuit had developed the law in a way to make it very difficult to ever prove
individual disparate treatment discrimination.
III. REEVES IN THE SUPREME COURT
In Reeves, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari on three issues
and, in a unanimous decision, decided two issues of importance.33 The Court first
30. Reeves, 197 F.3d at 693-94.
31. Id. at 692.
32. Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993).
33. Certiorari was granted on three questions:
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rejected the Fifth Circuit's pretext-plus rule as inconsistent with the Court's earlier
decision in Hicks. Second, the Supreme Court rejected that court's slicing and
dicing approach to deciding motions for summary judgment and judgment as a
matter of law in individual disparate treatment cases. Because the evidence
supporting the prima facie case, rejecting the defendant's reason as false, showing
age-related statements by a decisionmaker and other circumstantial evidence is all
probative to a finding of intent to discriminate, a reviewing court cannot disregard
that evidence since it is favorable to the nonmoving party. Instead, the court must
include all that evidence and then draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, typically the plaintiff. Putting the two parts of the opinion
together, motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law must be
denied where, looking at all the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and drawing
every inference in favor of the plaintiff, a reasonable fact finder could find for the
plaintiff.
A. The Court Rejects Justice Scalia's Invitation in Hicks
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 4 the Court continued the contraction of
the McDonnell Douglas strand of individual disparate treatment law which the
Court began in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.3" In Hicks, the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, rejected the grant of summary judgment to
plaintiffwho had proved her prima facie case as well as proving that the defendant's
reason was false36 and held that "the factfmder's disbelief of the reasons put forward
1. Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, is direct evidence of discriminatory
intent required to avoid judgment as a matter of law?
2. In determining whether to grant judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50,
should a district judge weigh all of the evidence or consider only the evidence favoring the
nonmoving party?
3. Is the standard for granting judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 the
same as the standard for granting judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50?
Answering the first question no, the Court found the answer to the second question to be an easy yes.
Describing the conflict among the circuits as "more semantic than real," the Court concluded that "in
entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review all of the evidence in the
record." 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000). Thus, the Fifth Circuit rule on what
evidence is to be reviewed in deciding a judgment as a matter of law was affirmed. The third question
was not answered directly; instead the Court relied on the authority under Rule 56 "that the court must
review the record 'taken as a whole' to support its cnclusion that "the standard for granting summaryjudgment 'mirrors' the standard for judgment as a matter of law .. " Id. The main thrust, then, of the
procedural section of the opinion focused on theway in which the Fifth Circuit had in this particular
case erroneously applied its rule that all the evidence in the record is reviewed in deciding a judgment
as a matter of law.
34. 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
35. 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
36. 509 U.S. at 512,113 S. Ct. at 2746 (quoting the court of appeals decision, 970 F.2d 487 (8th
Cir. 1992)). The language in Burdine supporting that interpretation was that, "placing this burden of
production on the defendant thus serves... to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." 450 U.S. at 255-56, 101 S. Ct.
at 1095.
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by the defendant... may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice
to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered
reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional. 37
His protestations to the contrary notwithstanding,3 Justice Scalia then added
dicta that some lower courts,39 including the Fifth Circuit,40 took to be an invitation
to further narrow the law by suggesting that, to establish liability, the plaintiff had
to adduce evidence over and above the evidence establishing the prima facie case
and the falsity of the defendant's asserted reason for the action. He said, "a reason
cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the
reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason."'4 ' Breaking down
what needs to be proved this way suggested that something more was required of
plaintiffs beyond proving her prima facie case and the falsity of defendant's
explanation. This something more came to be known as the "pretext-plus" rule.
The unanimous Court in Reeves reaffirmed the holding in Hicks and rejected
the pretext-plus rule.4" In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that "a
plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the
employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the employer unlawfully discriminated." 3
The pretext-plus courts' justification of the rule was based on the language
from Hicks, that the presumption of discrimination created when the plaintiff
initially proved the prima facie case "drops out of the picture" once the defendant
meets its burden of production by introducing evidence raising a factual question
that its asserted reason, not discrimination, explains the adverse action plaintiff was
challenging. These courts extended this "drops out of the picture" language beyond
dropping the presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie case to go
37. 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
38. In a footnote, he said that:
there is nothing whatever inconsistent between this statement [of the holding] and our later
statements that (1) the plaintiff must show "both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason" and (2) "it is not enough... to disbelieve the employer."
Even though (as we say here) rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law
to sustain a finding of discrimination, there must be afinding of discrimination.
509 U.S. 502, 511 n.4, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 n.4 (1993).
39. See Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc); Isenbergh v. Knight-
Ridder Newpaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436 (11 th Cir. 1996); Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676 (4th Cir.
1995); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255 (1st Cir. 1994).
40. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc).
41. 509U.S.at515, 113 S.Ct.at2752.
42. Thus, reversing the Fifth Circuit's holding that a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law when "the plaintiff's case consists exclusively of a prima facie case of discrimination and
sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
explanation of its action." 530 U.S. 133, 137, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2103 (2000).
43. Id. at 148, 120 S. Ct. at 2109. Justice O'Connor explained Hicks as holding "that the
rejection of the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action does not compeljudgment
for the plaintiff... [but] it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination
from the falsity of the employer's explanation." Id. at 146-47, 120 S. Ct. at 2108.
44. 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
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further and drop out the probative value of the evidence supporting the prima facie
case. With that evidence gone, more evidence was necessary before plaintiffwould
be able to prove discrimination. Justice O'Connor rejected that extension stating,
"although the presumption of discrimination 'drops out of the picture' once the
defendant meets its burden of production [Hicks] ... the trier of fact may still
consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case and inferences
properly drawn therefrom... on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation
is pretextual."45
Just as the evidence supporting plaintiff's prima facie case continues to have
probative value after the defendant puts on evidence of its reason, so does the
evidence that plaintiff introduced supporting the fact that defendant's reason was
false.
Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply
one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional
discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. . . . In appropriate
circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the
explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory
purpose.'
Evoking pre-Burdine authority, Justice O'Connor concluded by restating the
consequences for the employer of having its reason rejected by the fact finder.
"(O]nce the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well
be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the
best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. ' 47
The Court did not, however, go the final step and decide that a showing by the
plaintiff of a prima facie case plus sufficient evidence to find the employer's reason
is false will "always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability."4
Sometimes, even with evidence of plaintiff's prima facie case and of the falsity of
defendant's rebuttal explanation, "no rational factfinder could conclude that the
action was discriminatory." The factors that could lead a trial court to take a case
from the fact finder include "the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the
probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other
evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on
a motion for judgment as a matter of law."49
45. 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S. Ct. at 2106.
46. Id. at 147, 120 S. Ct. at 2108.
47. Id. at 147-48, 120 S. Ct. at 2108-09 (citing Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
577, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 2950 (1978) ("[W]hen all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who
we generally assume acts with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration.").
48. Id. at 148, 120 S. Ct. at 2109. This holding merely aligns discrimination law with how
litigation in general is treated. Thus, Justice O'Connor said: "To hold otherwise would be effectively
to insulate an entire category of employment discrimination cases from review under Rule 50, and we
have reiterated that trial courts should not 'treat discrimination differently from other questions of
fact."' Id. at 148, 120 S. Ct. at 2109.
49. Id. Justice O'Connor describes several scenarios where judgment as a matter of law would
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Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion, indicated that it should be
"uncommon" for cases to be taken from the jury. That should happen only when
it is conclusively demonstrated, by evidence the district court is required
to credit on a motion for judgment as a matter of law that . . .
discrimination could not have been the defendant's true motivation. If
such conclusive demonstrations are (as I suspect) atypical, if follows that
the ultimate question of liability ordinarily should not be taken from the
jury once the plaintiff has introduced the two categories of evidence [of
the prima facie case and that defendant's reason was false].-'
In sum, rejection of the pretext-plus rule should lead to many more individual
disparate treatment cases surviving a motion for summary judgment and going to
the fact finder and many fewer judgments as a matter of law being granted
overturning jury verdicts.
B. Drawing All Favorable Inferences from All the Evidence in Favor of the
Non-Moving Party
The Court quickly resolved the two related procedural questions presented by
accepting the Fifth Circuit's rule that both for motions for summaryjudgment under
Rule 56 and for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, "the court should
review all of the evidence in the record."51 Nevertheless, the Court found that the
Fifth Circuit had misapplied the rule in two significant ways. First, "the court
disregarded critical evidence favorable to [Reeves]-namely, the evidence
supporting [Reeves's] prima facie case and undermining [defendant's]
nondiscriminatory explanation."'52 Thus, based on its error concerning the pretext-
plus rule, the Fifth Circuit had rejected the probative value of that evidence put in
the record by the plaintiff and, therefore, in reviewing the record had erroneously
not included that evidence as evidence in the record. In addition to the
be appropriate.
For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record
conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or
if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was
untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no
discrimination had occurred.
Id. Surprisingly, Justice O'Connor appeared to leave one type of evidence off the list, evidence
supporting drawing the inference of discrimination even though it neither proves the elements of
plaintiff's barebones prima facie case as set forth in McDonnell Douglas nor proves that defendant's
reasbn is false. She may, however, be using the term "prima facie case" in the more general sense of
the ultimate burden the plaintiff has to prove that she was a victim of defendant's discrimination. As
she said earlier in her opinion: "The ultimate question is whether the employer intentionally
discriminated." Id. at 146, 120 S. Ct. at 2108. That interpretation is bolstered by the next section of
the opinion which looks at all the evidence supporting plaintiffs case.
50. Id. at 154-55, 120 S. Ct. at 2112.
51. Id. at 150, 120 S. Ct. at 2110.
52. Id. at 152, 120 S. Ct. at 2111.
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unchallenged evidence of a prima facie case, the evidence included the age-based
comments of the one decisionmaker, Chesnut, and the evidence that Chesnut was
the.actual decisionmaker behind Reeves's firing. Second, the "court also failed to
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of [Reeves]. 3
[W]hile acknowledging "the potentially damning nature" of Chesnut's
age-related comments, the court discounted them on the ground that they
"were not made in the direct context of Reeves's termination." And the
court discredited petitioner's evidence that Chesnut was the actual
decisionmaker by giving weight to the fact that there was "no evidence to
suggest that any of the other decisionmakers were motivated by age."
Moreover, the other evidence on which the court relied-that Caldwell
and Oswalt were also cited for poor recordkeeping, and that respondent
employed many managers over age 50-although relevant, is certainly not
dispositive.... In concluding that these circumstances so overwhelmed
the evidence favoring petitioner that no rational trier of fact could have
found that petitioner was fired because of his age, the Court of Appeals
impermissibly substituted its judgment concerning the weight of the
evidence for the jury's.'
To drive home the point of how serious the Fifth Circuit had blundered in its
approach, the Court found that no retrial was necessary but that the original verdict
should be reinstated.
C. Is the Whole Larger Than the Parts?
So, how important is Reeves and what about it is most important? The
minimalist view would be to view Reeves as simply deciding two points. The first
is the rejection of the pretext-plus view and the second is how to apply correctly the
rule that, in deciding motions for summaryjudgment or judgment as a matter of law,
the court is to look at all the evidence and draw every inference in favor of the
nonmoving party.
As to the first point, Reeves simply reaffirms Hicks by rejecting further
narrowing of the pretext-plus rule. Thus, Reeves, plus O'Connor v. Consolidated
Coin Caterers Corp,55 (the only other individual disparate treatment decision of the
Court since it decided Hicks and Hazen56 in 1993) stand for the proposition that the
Court does not sanction further narrowing of the McDonnell Douglas wing of
individual disparate treatment analysis. The structure of Justice O'Connor's
opinion gives some support to that interpretation because it treats the pretext-plus
as the core issue to be decided, with the procedural issues being of secondary
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting decision of the Fifth Circuit (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
55. 517 U.S. 308, 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996) (rejecting the Fourth Circuit's "safe harbor" rule
foreclosing age discrimination discharge claim where employee replacing plaintiff is at least age 40).
56. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
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concern. Indeed, the opinion explains that the reason the Court took the case was
to resolve the pretext-plus issue:
We granted certiorari ... to resolve a conflict among the Courts of
Appeals as to whether a plaintiff s prima facie case of discrimination (as
defined inMcDonnellDouglas.. .), combined with sufficient evidence for
a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory
explanation for its decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of liability for
intentional discrimination."
As to the second point, the Court did not really focus on the Fifth Circuit's
slicing and dicing approach to reviewing the record in determining motions for
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. Instead, the focus was on the
wrong application of the facts of the particular case to the rule that all the evidence
is to be reviewed in deciding motions for judgment as a matter of law. The failure
to focus on the general approach of the Fifth Circuit which had been to slice and
dice away most of plaintiff's evidence as not probative before applying the standard
of review for motions for judgment as a matter of law may be a consequence of the
Court's finding the procedural questions presented to be so easily decided in favor
of the Fifth Circuit's rule. That resulted in the bulk of the last part of the opinion
being devoted to the correct application of that standard of review to the facts of
this case. The application phase of any Supreme Court opinion may not be viewed
as significant beyond its resolution of the particular case.5"
For Reeves to be a truly significant case-a decision where the whole is greater
than its two parts-it is necessary to look at the underlying and unifying rationale
of both parts of the opinion. That rationale is that, despite the intricacies of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis and its procedural operation to develop a record, it is
necessary to consider all the evidence that is produced as a result of those
procedures being followed. That evidence includes evidence supporting the prima
facie case, evidence tending to prove the defendant's proffered reason to be false,
and all other circumstantial evidence such as age-related comments of
decisionmakers that supports plaintiff's case. Slicing and dicing away ofplaintiff's
evidence to leave only evidence supporting defendant's case is inconsistent with the
true nature of the McDonnell Douglas method of analyzing individual disparate
treatment cases. To say this another way, what the Fifth Circuit did wrong in
57. 530 U.S. at 140, 120 S. Ct. at 2104.
58. Professor Henry H. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Hare. L. Rev. 84
(1959), criticized the Court for hearing and deciding too many Federal Employers' Liability Act cases
to apply correctly the rules to those individual cases. Spending so much time doing that diverted the
Court from its broader role in the development of federal statutory law by the federal judiciary:
It will be seen that what matters about Supreme Court opinions is not their quantity but their
quality. And it will be seen that the test of the quality of an opinion is the light it casts,
outside the four comers of the particular lawsuit, in guiding the judgment of the hundreds
of thousands of lawyer and government officials who have to deal at first hand with the
problems of everyday life and of the thousands ofjudges who have to handle the great mass
of the litigation which ultimately develops.
Id. at 96.
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Reeves was to exclude from consideration almost all the probative evidence
supporting plaintiff's case before it ever applied the Rule 50 test. It is a mistake to
throw out most of plaintiff's evidence before reviewing the record for a motion for
judgment as a matter of law. All the evidence in the record supporting plaintiff's
case and every inference based on that evidence must be viewed in favor of the
nonmoving plaintiff. The most significant lesson of the Supreme Court in Reeves
is the necessity to include all the probative evidence in the record, without regard
to which part of the McDonnell Douglas analysis it might be relevant, before
deciding motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law. 9
IV. REEVES APPUED IN THE LOWER COURTS
The early returns of decisions by the lower courts suggest that the lower courts
have not changed their practices significantly despite the new approach ordered by
the Court in Reeves. The courts still are slicing and dicing away plaintiff's evidence
before reviewing the record for purposes of deciding motions for summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law. Further, at least one court has suggested
a new way to narrow the application of the McDonnell Douglas wing of individual
disparate treatment law to replace the now discredited "pretext-plus" rule by
requiring direct evidence that the pretext was a lie, rather than merely requiring
evidence that the employer's reason was false. Finally, at least one court has
predicted that, as a consequence of Reeves, many more defendants will challenge,
rather than concede, plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case because Reeves
now requires that evidence to be considered.
This section begins with a quick review of the response of the Fifth Circuit to
the Supreme Court's repudiation of its approach in Reeves and then discusses the
developments among the other courts of appeals. The first two of the three post-
Reeves decisions of the Fifth Circuit appear to minimalize it; the third does seem
to attempt to implement it. In Vadie v. Mississippi State University,6 the court
assumed that the decision of the panel that decided Reeves had been an aberration
and that the true law of the circuit as established in Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil
59. In essence, Reeves adopts the approach suggested by Judge Denny Chin:
The best approach is perhaps the most basic one: first, evaluating plaintiff's proof, direct or
otherwise, of discrimination; second, evaluating defendant's proof that it did not
discriminate, including evidence of defendant's explanation for its employment decision;
and, third, evaluating the evidence as a whole. Courts should focus on the "ultimate issue"
of whether the plaintiff has proven that it is more likely than not that the employer's
decision was motivated at least in part by an impermissible or discriminatory reason. In a
summary judgment context or on a motion for judgment as a matter of law following a
verdict for the plaintiff, the court must evaluate the evidence as a whole resolving all
conflicts in the proof and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Chin & Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas, supra note 16, at 673.
60. 218 F.3d 365,373 (5th Cir. 2000) (overturning the denial of defendant's motion forjudgment
as a matter of law by district court after jury verdict for plaintiffbecause, other than proof of plaintiff's
Iranian ancestry, "there is nothing probative anywhere in the record of the ultimate question of national
origin discrimination.").
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Tools,6 was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Reeves: "Rhodes is
consistent with Reeves and continues to be the governing standard in this circuit.
This appeal falls within the exception noted by Reeves and Rhodes."62
In the second decision, Rubenstein v. Administrators ofthe Tulane Educational
Fund,63 the court, in the face of the Supreme Court's decision in Reeves, continued
to apply the circuit's prior law that stray remarks were not probative of
discrimination so as to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
[T]he only evidence offered by Rubinstein in support of his claims of
discriminatory intent relate to comments made by Professor Watts, a
member of the relevant committees responsible for making promotion and
pay-raise decisions, that Rubinstein was a "Russian Yankee" and that Jews
are thrifty, as well as an isolated remark by Professor Bruce, also a
member of the relevant committees, that if"the Russian Jew" could obtain
tenure, then anyone could."
Based on Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc. ,65 the court held that "these comments are best
viewed under our Circuit precedent as stray remarks, thus not warranting survival
of summary judgment."6
The third and most recent decision, Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture,'7
is the first decision of the Fifth Circuit to take Reeves seriously. In reversing the
trial court's grant of a judgment as a matter of law for defendant, the court
disagreed with Vadie as to the effect of Reeves on Rhodes.
We do not see much to be gained from dissecting Rhodes to divine [its
central features that survive Reeves]. Rather, we simply comply with the
Supreme Court's mandate inReeves notto substitute our judgment for that
of the jury and not to unduly restrict plaintiff's circumstantial case of
discrimination. We therefore underscore that Reeves is the authoritative
statement regarding the standard for judgment as a matter of law in
discrimination cases. Reeves guides our decisions, and insofar as Rhodes
is inconsistent with Reeves, we follow Reeves."
The Russell court also held, unlike the panel in Rubenstein, that Reeves had
changed the stray remarks jurisprudence of the circuit as it had been established in
61. 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
62. 218 F.3d at 373 n.23. Similarly, the Second Circuit has so far concluded that Reeves is
"wholly compatible and harmonious" with its pretext-plus decision. See Fisher v. Vassar College, 114
F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc); James v. New York Racing Ass'n &New York State Racing &
Wagering Bd., 233 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.
2000).
63. 218 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's
discrimination claim).
64. Id. at 400.
65. 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996).
66. 218 F.3d at 401.
67. 235 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2000).
68. Id. at 223 n.4.
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Brown. "The Court in Reeves made clear that viewing remarks that a jury could
find to evidence animus through the harsh lens employed by the Reeves panel
(which, in turn, relied upon Brown) was unacceptable. 69
In sum, if the more recent decision in Russell carries the day over the earlier
decisions of Vadie and Rubenstein, the Fifth Circuit appears to be well on its way
to implementing Reeves in the jurisprudence of the circuit. This prospect appears
more favorable than does the application of Reeves in some of the other circuits.
Looking first at summary judgment decisions, in Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield Association,70 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to the employer, holding that the plaintiff failed to adduce
sufficient evidence that the employer's reason for his discharge was a pretext for
discrimination. The plaintiff was an accountant for Blue Cross-Blue Shield who
was discharged in a reduction in force. Kulumani sued, alleging national-origin
discrimination because of his Indian heritage. To implement the reduction in force,
the employer "required its managers to pare their staffs using performance and
seniority as benchmarks, but without any mechanical rule."'" Kulumani's
supervisor evaluated the employees under his supervision and selected three for
discharge. Kulumani was not among them, but the Director of Human Resources
then overturned the supervisor's decision, deciding that Kulumani should be
discharged instead of one of the three the supervisor had targeted, allegedly because
the other employee was better qualified than plaintiff. Kulumani claimed that,
absent discrimination, the person originally picked for discharge by his supervisor
would have been discharged instead of hirn.
In analyzing whether plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to withstand
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court created a new, narrowing rule
which it claimed was consistent with Reeves's rejection of the pretext-plus rule.
The court also appeared to continue to use the slicing and dicing away of the
evidence approach that had also been rejected in Reeves. Although the Human
Resources Director's decision was unusual, the court said that did not make it
suspicious. In order to show that the Director's "intervention was a pretext for
discrimination [the plaintiff] needed to establish not that it was unusual but that the
stated reason (quality control)" for the employment decision "means more than an
unusual act; it means something worse than a business error; 'pretext' means deceit
used to cover one's tracks."' Moreover, the court then read Reeves as making
"clear... that pretext means a dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or
an error."'73 It was at this point that the court took a big leap to conclude that Reeves
required what appears to be direct evidence that the Director lied about why he
69. Id. at 226. Applying Reeves to the record, the court held that "[t]he remarks at issue in this
case [frequent references to plaintiff as "old bitch"] because of their content indicates age animus and
the speaker (Ciulla) was primarily responsible for Russell's termination." Id.
70. 224 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2000).
71. Id. at 683.
72. Id. at 684 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48, 120 S.
Ct. 2097, 2108-09 (2000)).
73. Id. at 685 (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S. Ct. at 2108).
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picked Kulumani to be discharged instead of the person the supervisor had
recommended. The evidence that the decision was unusual was found not to be
probative of pretext and so Kulumani had adduced no evidence of deceit--"no
statements by [the Director], no disparate impact from managerial interventions,
nothing except the raw fact that [the Director] stepped in."
In contrast to the approach of the Seventh Circuit in Kulumani, the Court in
Reeves described the evidence at issue about the defendant's proffered explanation
as tending to show that it was false, not that it directly proved defendant's reason
to be a lie. Thus, the Court said that plaintiff "made a substantial showing that
respondent's explanation was false." 74 Based on evidence that the reason advanced
by the employer was false, the fact finder can first draw the inference that the
defendant is not telling the truth and then further draw the inference that the
employer is lying to cover up its true reason, which is discrimination. "In
appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of
the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory
purpose."" Further, a finding that the reason defendant advances is in fact false
plus a finding that plaintiff had proved his prima facie case means that there is no
evidence of a nondiscriminatory explanation in the record for the action: Proof of
the prima facie case excludes the most common legitimate reasons for the
defendant's action, and proof of the falseness of the nondiscriminatory reason
offered by defendant to explain its action means there is no evidence in the record
of a nondiscriminatory reason for defendant's action. In the absence of evidence
of any nondiscriminatory reason, it is appropriate, though as Hicks makes clear not
necessary, for the fact finder to draw the inference that the real reason is
discrimination. "[O]nce the employer's justification has been eliminated,
discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since
the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision." '76
Second, in upholding summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit appears to be
drawing inferences in favor of the moving, rather than the nonmoving party. The
opinion reads more like the Fifth Circuit's, and not the Supreme Court's, decision
in Reeves." For example, Kulumani had adduced circumstantial evidence that he
was more qualified than the employee whose job was saved by his discharge by
showing that his performance ratings were better than those of the other employee.
The court rejected the inference that that evidence supported plaintiff's claim that
his discharge was not because he was not doing as good a job but was for
discrimination by countering that claim with defendant's evidence that the employee
74. 530 U.S. at 144, 120 S. Ct. at 2107. "Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of
credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence .... Id. at 147, 120 S. Ct. at 2108.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 147, 120 S. Ct. at 2108-09.
77. Id. at150,120S. Ctat2110. In Reeves, the Court described grants of summary judgment
under Rule 56 as "analogous" to the grant of a judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50. Thus, the
"standard for granting summary judgment 'mirrors' the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such
that 'the inquiry under each is the same."' Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250-51,106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511-12 (1986)).
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who was not discharged had more seniority, and thus could have been retained for
that reason even though the defendant did not claim seniority was the basis of its
decision to discharge plaintiff. Further, the court found that, even if seniority was
not a factor, "a reasonable trier of fact could [not] conclude that [the Director] lied
when she said that Kulumani and [the employee whose job was saved by plaintiff's
discharge] were not tied in performance assessments." 8 In doing so, the court
relied on the average ratings given by the employer to each employee which favored
the retained employee, instead of their median ratings which favored plaintiff.
In sum, the interpretation the Kulumani court gave to Reeves was at best
strained on both parts of that decision. The court certainly did not respond to the
underlying rationale of Reeves that all plaintiff's evidence counts and must be
considered in a motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. At
worst, Kulumani may begin a new line of cases that again unduly restrict the
application of the McDonnell Douglas approach in the way that the now discredited
"pretext-plus" rule had narrowed that analysis. Requiring evidence not only that
defendant's reason was false but that it was a lie sounds like a restatement of the
pretext-plus rule. Further, the court sliced and diced its way through the evidence
in the record in order to draw every inference in favor of the employer, who was the
moving rather than the nonmoving party for the grant ofsummaryjudgment. Stated
another way, the Seventh Circuit in Kulumani appeared either to turn Reeves on its
head or to barely acknowledge its existence.
The First Circuit also failed to follow the lesson of Reeves by continuing to
slice and dice the evidence in the record in order to draw inferences in favor of the
employer, the party moving for summary judgment. In Williams v. Raytheon
Company,"9 plaintiff, a fifty-oneyear old male, challenged his discharge from hisjob
as Director of Internal Communications as discriminatory because of sex and age.
Williams introduced evidence that his supervisor, a woman, upon being employed,
"told members of her department that she thought" the Company "was run by 'old,
white men,' that she intended to change the corporate culture, and that she would
favor the hiring of women and younger people."' Plaintiff adduced evidence that
her style was assertive and abrasive. For example, she forced a woman employee
out of the company by assigning her computer tasks that she knew the employee
could not perform. She also, by mistake, approved the premature publication of a
press release announcing that a government contract had been awarded to Raytheon.
In response to an investigation of that leak by the government, she allegedly ordered
the plaintiff to prepare a false statement about the event, making him blame his
secretary for the early release of the story rather than accepting responsibility
herself. The plaintiff maintained that after he told the government investigators
about this incident, the supervisor threatened his job. The plaintiff further alleged
that the supervisor "conducted a campaign of harassment against him to prevent him
78. 224 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2000).
79. 220 F.3d 16 (lstCir. 2000).
80. Id. at 18.
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from performing hisjob."' This harassment allegedly culminated in an altercation
concerning a memorandum that the plaintiff wrote to his supervisor over changes
she proposed in company publications, "the tone of which" the supervisor
"considered hostile and sarcastic."82 When the supervisor met with the plaintiff
concerning that memorandum, plaintiff allegedly threatened her. Plaintiff was
thereafter put on suspension for insubordination, and "was eventually replaced by
a forty-eight year old white man." 3
The First Circuit claimed to apply Reeves in reviewing plaintiff's case.
Indicating that the employer in Reeves had accused plaintiff of "shoddy record
keeping," but the plaintiffhad shown that accusation was false because he presented
evidence "that he had properly maintained attendance records and that he was not
responsible for failure to discipline late and absent employees."' In so doing,
Reeves had established that the employer's proffered reason was "false."
Apparently assuming that pretext could only be proved by plaintiff's proof that the
employer's reason was false, the court then found that Williams had "made no
showing, much less a substantial showing, that the insubordination justification was
false.""5 Further, the plaintiff and the supervisor "had an acrimonious working
relationship," which deteriorated completely when the supervisor proposed changes
for the company's publications.
The First Circuit missed an important step in Reeves: Once plaintiff introduces
evidence that a reasonable fact finder could rely on to conclude that the reason the
employer gave for his discharge was not the real reason for the defendant's action,
that evidence, along with evidence supporting the prima facie case and all the other
circumstantial evidence, would allow the fact finder to draw the inference that the
employer gave a false reason in order to cover up its real reason, that it was
discharging plaintiff because of his age. While the acrimonious working
relationship between Williams and his supervisor was like the relationship between
Reeves and Chesnut,86 the fundamental issue is not whether that acrimonious
relationship was factually true or false, but whether the supervisor provoked
plaintiff and then used his response to justify terminating the plaintiff to hide her
true reason-that he was fired because he was an older white male. So, the
falseness that is relevant to the use of the Reeves analysis is whether the
insubordination actually was the reason for the discharge or whether that incident
was used as a pretext for discrimination. The First Circuit in Williams took a
narrow, mechanical approach that fails to implement McDonnell Douglas as now
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 220 F.3d at 19 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 144, 120
S. Ct. 2097, 2107 (2000)).
85. Id. (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S. Ct. at 2109).
86. The facts resemble those in Hicks where the bad blood between the supervisor and the
plaintiff unquestionably existed, and the real issue was why the supervisor acted on that bad blood. The
Court there upheld the fact finder's conclusion that plaintiff had not proved that the supervisor took the
action because of race. 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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understood in light of Reeves. An approach more sympathetic to the purposes of
the laws against discrimination would have likely sent the case to the jury rather
than uphold the granting of summary judgment.
Further, the First Circuit appeared to misapply Rule 56 by slicing and dicing
through the record to draw inferences most favorable to the employer as the moving
party. Regarding the "stray remarks" made by the plaintiff's supervisor that she
wanted more women and young people, that she sought to change the company's
"old, white men culture," that the supervisor had told the plaintiff "to give credit for
a brochure he created to a female assistant," and that the when the plaintiff "accused
her of wanting him out because he was an older man, she remained silent," the court
rejected the probative value of all of this evidence and the inference of
discrimination created by it because the supervisor had hired men, in one instance
replacing an older woman with a young man. To say it again, the opinion in
Williams reads more like the Fifth Circuit opinion in Reeves rather than the opinion
of the Supreme Court. This is so because the court failed to heed the lesson
underlying Reeves that all of plaintiffs evidence counts and that, in looking at all
the evidence, the court must draw every reasonable inference if favor of the
nonmoving plaintiff in deciding whether a case should be sent to the fact finder.
Despite Reeves, the courts also continue to overturn jury awards by granting
motions for judgment as a matter of law by parsing the record looking for evidence
favorable to the moving party, rather than drawing every inference in favor of the
non-moving party. For example, in Massey v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Illinois,8"
the Seventh Circuit affxmed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of
law, setting aside a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was an African-
American woman who had been successful in one department and was later
transferred to another department where her troubles began. Her supervisor in the
new department was a white woman. Two other African-American women and one
other white woman made up the department. From the time she began working in
the new department, plaintiff's performance evaluations from her new supervisor
were not positive, including an evaluation of her writing as "below average.""8
After being placed on probation, plaintiff was ultimately fired by her supervisor.
The employer relied upon the plaintiff's negative performance evaluations,
specifically her alleged "poor writing, investigatory, and follow-up skills" as its
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her. 9 To demonstrate that this
reason was pretextual, the plaintiff introduced evidence that her performance
evaluations in her former department had been extremely positive, that, compared
to the work of her peers in her new department, her performance was good, that her
supervisor had called her stupid, and that her work had been redone even when she
had modeled her work on work which previously had been deemed acceptable. The
plaintiff maintained that her performance evaluations were negative because of her
supervisor's racial stereotyping. In order to establish that stereotyping, the plaintiff
87. 226 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2000).
88. Id. at 924.
89. Id.
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introduced evidence that her white co-worker "was given more assistance [by her
supervisor] than she was, and that" her supervisor "had tried to separate the races
through seating assignments" with all the African-American workers on one side of
the office and the whites on the other.*°
The Seventh Circuit interpreted Reeves as permitting the plaintiff to
demonstrate that she was a victim of discrimination "by convincing the jury that
Blue Cross's claim of firing her for poor writing, investigatory skills, and follow-
through was actually a pretext for discrimination, or by other evidence from which
it could find intentional discrimination."' In applying that standard, the court first
noted that, as in Reeves, the plaintiff had introduced evidence that could allow the
fact-finder to infer that Blue Cross's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was "not
worthy of belief." Nevertheless, the court found that the plaintiff's evidence was
not sufficient to show pretext because "earlier performance evaluations that relate
to less demanding jobs are of little value in assessing an employee's present
performance."9 The court also found that the examples of her written work were
insufficient to demonstrate pretext, even though the comments on her work were
suspect. The court then rejected as insufficient evidence of pretext the testimony
of the supervisor that "she could not explain why she had evidently criticized [the
plaintiff] more than others."93 The court also rejected the plaintiff's evidence of
discriminatory intent as shown by the fact that she was replaced by a white woman
and that another white woman had "received better treatment" than she had. Lastly,
the court rejected the plaintiff's proffered evidence of "stray remarks"-the
comment by her supervisor that she was "stupid"-and the fact that the office was
racially segregated with all the African Americans assigned to desks along one side
and the white workers along the other because the office was small. Thus, the court
granted a judgment as a matter of law.
As in the cases dealing with summary judgment, this case, granting a judgment
as a matter of law, applies Reeves in a mechanical way, failing to understand the
role circumstantial evidence plays in the fact finding process. Further, as to the
standard to be applied in deciding a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the
opinion again reads like the Fifth Circuit's approach in Reeves and not the radically
different approach the Supreme Court took in reversing the Fifth Circuit.
One final note on what may become an unintended consequence of Reeves. In
Smith v. Chicago Park District," the Seventh Circuit upheld granting summary
judgment where the district court found that plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case. In so doing the court made clear that
Reeves "may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully
discriminated. But Reeves adds nothing material to the analysis in the instant case,
90. Id.
91. Id. at 925 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-49, 120 S.
Ct. 2097,2108-09 (2000)) ("also emphasizing that the trier of fact is not required to find discrimination
if it rejects the defendant's explanation").
92. Id.
93. Id. at 926.
94. No. 99-3629, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16240 (7th Cir. July 1I, 2000).
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since Smith failed to meet his burdens of establishing either a prima facie case or
pretext.""5 While not directly affecting what it takes to establish a prima facie case,
Reeves may, nonetheless, cause defendants more frequently to challenge, rather than
concede, plaintiff's proof of a prima facie case. The district judge in Jordan v.
Olsten Corporation' made just such a point. In noting that the employer failed "to
dispute whether [plaintiff] had established a prima facie claim of discrimination,"
the court noted that "[i]n the future, perhaps Reeves will cause all defense counsel
to be more reluctant to concede for the purposes of argument that a plaintiff has
established a prima facie case." Reeves may cause such a strategic change since,
before that decision, many courts viewed the evidence supporting a prima facie case
as dropping from the case once the defendant carried its burden of introducing
evidence of its nondiscriminatory reason, and defendants always carried that
burden.9 Now, however, Reeves has made it clear that the evidence supporting the
establishment of the prima facie case continues to have probative value toward the
ultimate question of whether the defendant acted with an intent to discriminate even
after the defendant does come forward with evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason
for its challenged action. The probative value of the evidence supporting the prima
facie case does not drop from the case. Thus, if the defendant concedes that
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, plaintiff might be expected to ask the
judge to direct the jury that it must find that the most common legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer's decision are in fact not the reasons for
defendant's action. To avoid such an instruction, defendants may now more
frequently fight over whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case.
In sum, the lower courts have yet to recognize the potential of Reeves and
appear to be continuing business as usual in approaching individual disparate
treatment cases relying onMcDonnellDouglas analysis. The next section addresses
some of the reasons for their failure to follow the lead of the Supreme Court.
V. WHY REEVES IS YET TO BE FOLLOWED
Having now rejected the slice and dice approach in the context of both
summaryjudgments and judgments as a matter of law, the Supreme Court in Reeves
has set the stage for a possible rejuvenation of individual disparate treatment law.
What is puzzling is that, at least in the first round of the lower court interpretations
of Reeves, these courts have not followed the lesson of the Supreme Court's
decision and appear not to have understood the significance of its holding that all
of plaintiff's evidence must count. There are several reasons why this may be true.
First, it may simply be too early to expect that the effect of the Reeves decision
95. Id. at *6 n.l.
96. 111 F. Supp.2d 227 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
97. Id.
98. In a law review article, Federal District Court Judge Denny Chin concluded that no reported
case involves an employer having failed to come forward with a nondiscriminatory reason for its action.
See Chin, supra note 16, at 665.
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would be appreciated fully by the practicing bar and argued to the lower federal
courts.
While that may be corrected over time, several aspects of the decision in
Reeves may make that more difficult, or, at least, make it take longer for its full
potential to be realized. The opinion of Justice O'Connor is structured as if its
major thrust is only to the "pretext-plus" point. Indeed, it is on that point that she
claims the Court granted certiorari. And, the section that deals with the rejection
of the slicing and dicing approach to the review by courts for the purpose of
deciding motions for summary judgment and judgments as a matter of law appears
to be the simple follow-up to the procedural decision that the court so easily
reached. The deeper meaning of Reeves-that all the plaintiff's evidence
counts-may be lost if the decision is viewed as simply the exercise of the
traditional judicial craft of applying facts to law. "
Second, it may be that the judges on the lower courts are not fully open to
Reeves because it is at odds with their beliefs about how serious a problem
discrimination actually presents. There is data suggesting that federal judges,
without regard to their political background, have come to view discrimination as
less of a problem than it once was and now only involving the idiosyncratic
behavior of a few employers. " Take, for example, the skepticism of Judges Jacobs
and Leval writing for six members of the Second Circuit enbanc in Fisher v. Vassar
College'°. and adopting the pretext-plus rule. As to the significance of plaintiff
establishing a prima facie case based on McDonnell Douglas, the court described
the effect of establishing a prima face case-of rejecting the most typical
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer's action-as minimally relevant to
proof that the employer acted with an intent to discriminate:
[T]he essential elements of this diminished, minimal prima facie case do
not necessarily support a reasonable inference of illegal discrimination.
In our diverse workplace, virtually any decision in which one employment
applicant is chosen from a pool of qualified candidates will support a slew
of prima facie cases of discrimination. The rejected candidates are likely
99. Professor Cass R. Sunstein advocates judicial minimalism as a preferred approach for the
Court. See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (1999).
Minimalism is in tension with the leadership role of the Supreme Court in developing federal statutory
law. Hart, supra note 58, at 96, articulated that leadership role. He states that:
[the] test of the quality of an opinion is the light it casts, outside the four corners of the
particular Jawsuit, in guiding the judgment of the hundreds of thousands of lawyers and
government officials who have to deal at first hand with the problems of everyday life and
of the thousands of judges who have to handle the great mass of the litigation which
ultimately develops.
100. Professor Deborah A. Calloway has demonstrated that the Hicks decision is based on the
underlying assumption by federal judges that discrimination is much less of a problem than it was when
McDonnell Douglas was first decided. Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks:
Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 Conn. L Rev. 997 (1994). See also Vicki Schultz, Telling
Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretation of Sex-Segregation in the Workplace in Title
VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv. L Rev. 1749 (1990).
101. 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
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to be older, or to differ in race, religion, sex, and national origin from the
chosen candidate. Each of these differences will support a prima facie case
of discrimination, even though a review of the full circumstances may
conclusively show that illegal discrimination played no part whatever in
the selection. 2
Similarly, the effect of proving that the defendant's reason was false was also
minimized:
To the extent that an actor in defendant's position is unlikely to have
proffered a false explanation except to conceal a discriminatory motive,
then the false explanation will be powerful evidence ofdiscrimination. On
the other hand, if the circumstances show that the defendant gave the false
explanation to conceal something other than discrimination, the inference
of discrimination will be weak or nonexistent. And if, on examination of
the circumstances, there are many possible reasons for the false
explanation, stated or unstated, and illegal discrimination is no more likely
than others, then the pretext gives minimal support to plaintiff's claim of
discrimination. 3
While all this discussion is appropriate for the jury in finding the facts and applying
the law, the Second Circuit used it to prevent cases from getting to the jury in the
first instance through the grant of motions for summary judgment or by overturning
verdicts of the jury by grant of motions for judgment as a matter of law.
Third, if those attitudes are prevalent among federal judges at the circuit and
district court levels, the question is whether the failure to implement Reeves can
realistically be corrected by the Supreme Court. Hopefully not, but Reeves may be
an example of the limited power that the Supreme Court actually has to shape
federal statutory law as enforced in the lower federal courts."° In the 1999 term of
the Supreme Court, it considered 2070 petitions on its Appellate Docket, 5269 on
its Miscellaneous Docket, granted review in 92, and issued full opinions in 74. "
Given the wide array of constitutional and federal statutory issues that can come to
the Court, it is not surprising that, since the Rehnquist Court set what it saw as the
structure of individual disparate treatment law with Price Waterhouse in 1989 and
102. Id. at 1337.
103. Id. at 1338.
104. In arguing for the creation of anew national court of appeals, Professor Paul M. Bator, What
is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 Univ. of Pitt. L Rev 673, 679-80 (1990), characterized the
structure of review wherein the Supreme Court exercised the only national review by certiorari of all
of the decisions of the lower federal courts as well as of the state courts deciding federal questions as
a system that did not work.
This is not a sensible system. It is a system that is jammed at the top. It is a system that
breeds uncertainty, instability, and contradiction. And of course uncertainty and instability
and contradiction feed on themselves. The more uncertainty and contradiction there is in the
law, the greater there is incentive to litigate, and the more new cases there will be in the
future. Thus, the jamming can only get worse.
105. The Supreme Court, 1999 Term, The Statistics, 114 Hare. L Rev. 397, Table 11 (B) & (C)
(2000).
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Hicks and Hazen Paper in 1993, the Court has only revisited this area of the law in
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. in 1996 and in Reeves in 2000.
Both of these decisions reined in lower courts that were narrowing the McDonnell
Douglas wing of individual disparate treatment law even further than the Court had
in Hicks and Hazen. It may be too much to expect that the Supreme Court has the
capacity to make sure that its deeper vision of individual disparate treatment law
will be fully implemented by the lower courts."°
If it is too early to know whether the full potential of Reeves will be realized,
it is also too early to give up hope. Through symposia such as this and other
academic writing, as well as assertive action by parties to individual disparate
treatment case, the legal culture of the law can develop and should change for the
better.
106. Having attended the oral arguments in Reeves, it seemed clear to me that the Court would use
the traditional judicial craft approach ofdeciding the case narrowly, making no more general statements
than necessary to decide the case at hand. A review of the briefs of the parties and the amici suggests
that the Court was not asked by anyone to do more. It may be that the deeper meaning of Reeves is less
the result of conscious choice of Justice O'Connor in drafting her opinion and more a consequence of
her recognition of the faulty basis for the pretext-plus rule as well as her need to resolve the particular
case through her careful application of Rule 50 as to judgments as a matter of law.
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